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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most precious rights afforded by the United States Consti-
tution is a person's right to due process under the law.2 Stated differ-
ently, the state cannot deprive one of life, liberty or property without
providing that person with both notice of the intended deprivation, and
an opportunity to challenge such a deprivation.3 While protection from a
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law is one
of the most important rights an individual possesses, the United States
Supreme Court consistently interprets the Fourteenth Amendment
vaguely, allowing American tribunals to interpret the standard as nar-
rowly as they choose.4
A prime example of this phenomenon occurs with the Texas Education
Agency's ("TEA") tendency toward a narrow interpretation of a
teacher's procedural due process rights. In Texas, the state government
takes on the responsibility of regulating the certification of its teachers.5
The state agency that has been appointed this responsibility is the State
Board for Educator Certification ("SBEC").6 Section II of this comment
will address SBEC's current procedures governing teacher misconduct.
In section III, a brief history of procedural due process is set forth with an
explanation of exactly why teachers deserve procedural due process of
law, followed by an analysis of the reasons why such protection is being
denied. Finally, section IV will propose a solution that attempts to pre-
serve the current system as much as possible.
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (ensuring that no "State [shall] deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
3. See McGrath, 341 U.S. at 171-72 (articulating that there is no better way to uncover
the truth than providing notice and an opportunity to be heard to the individual in
jeopardy).
4. See Richard B. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive
Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 115, (1978) ("Although sweep-
ing and colorful... judicial attempts at articulating a meaningful constitutional standard
leave much to be desired.").
5. See generally TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2004-2005) (out-
lining educator certification, disciplinary procedures, and governing the State Board for
Educator Certification).
6. See generally Act of May 30, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 21, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
2 (Vernon) (codified as amended at TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21 (Vernon 1996 & Supp.
2004-2005)) (creating SBEC's authority for all disciplinary procedures with regard to a
teaching certificate); see also TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2004-
2005). When this comment was written, SBEC and the Texas Education Agency "TEA"
were two separate agencies, but SBEC recently merged under the TEA umbrella. SBEC
will still be the authority on certification and disciplinary proceedings for educators. See
Press Release, Texas Education Agency, TEA to SBEC: Welcome Home! (Aug. 11, 2005),
http://www.tea.state.tx.us/press/sbecrelease.html.
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II. THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS
A. Overview
Current SBEC procedures, at the very least, resemble violations of ed-
ucators' procedural due process rights. Take, for example, a teacher who
has been accused of sexual misconduct with a student.7 The employing
school district must provide written notice to the teacher of a proposed
termination of employment.8 The teacher will then proceed through a
series of hearings pertaining to the teacher's employment within the
school district.9 Even in the scenario where a teacher resigns, the district
is still required to report the alleged misconduct to SBEC.' °
A subtler example is also conceivable. For instance, consider teacher
A, who does not get along with teacher B. Teacher A can file a complaint
directly to SBEC, 1 citing a marginal code of ethics violation against
teacher B. 2 Complaints for code of ethics violations can be filed for vio-
lations as inconsequential as spreading rumors about teacher A. 1 3 Any
complaint results in an investigatory warning that will be attached to
teacher B's certificate prior to investigation.'
4
In either situation, the teacher's virtual certificate is "flagged" with an
investigatory warning until SBEC initiates a formal complaint with the
7. Unfortunately, this is not an uncommon occurrence. See, e.g., Tisby v. Dallas In-
dep. Sch. Dist., No. 067-R2-100 Comm'r of Educ. State of Texas (2000); Texas Educ.
Agency v. Averiett, No. 200-TIC-391 Comm'r of Educ. State of Texas (1991).
8. See generally § 21 (articulating termination procedures for probationary, continuing
and term contracts).
9. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21(F)-(G) (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2004-2005) (outlin-
ing the administrative hearing process as well as appeals to the commissioner of
education).
10. See 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 249.14(d) (2004) (stating that the school district's
superintendent shall notify SBEC within seven days of obtaining any knowledge indicating,
among other violations, sexual misconduct of a minor); see also State Board for Educator
Certification, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.sbec.state.tx.us/SBECOnline/invest
disc/faq.asp (last visited Oct. 11, 2005).
11. Linda L. Schlueter, Parental Rights in the Twenty-First Century: Parents as Full
Partners in Education, 32 ST. MARY'S L.J. 611, 668 n.384 (2001) (citing the authority al-
lowing parents and teachers to file complaints directly to SBEC) (citing 25 Tex. Reg. 5332
(2000) (to be codified as an amendment to 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 249.56)).
12. See generally 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 247 (2004) (dictating code of ethics
violations).
13. See 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 247.2(b)(2)(B) (2004) (stating that a code of ethics
standard is breeched when a teacher knowingly makes false statements regarding another
teacher).
14. Memorandum from Herman L. Smith to State Board for Educator Certification,
Action on Petition for Adoption of a Rule Relating to 19 TAC Chapter 249 (Aug. 6, 2004),
http://www.sbec.state.tx.us/SBECOnlineibrdinfo/agendas/2004_08/5.pdf.
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State Office of Administrative Hearings ("SOAH"), 5 which is the arbi-
trator of such matters.
16
These hypothetical situations were chosen for two reasons. First, they
help illustrate the arbitrary character of the disciplinary procedures
wherein the two alleged acts of misconduct are treated without distinc-
tion. 7 Second, according to SBEC website, these are the two most com-
mon acts of misconduct that are investigated by SBEC.18
B. SBEC
1. Overview
The SBEC was created in 1995 to oversee all matters concerning
teacher certification. 9 Before 1995, the responsibility rested solely on
the shoulders of the TEA. 0 The SBEC was created in a legislative effort
to expand teachers' rights by allowing them to govern themselves.2 The
original legislative intent invokes a sense of irony, as it may be argued
that despite the desire to augment teachers' autonomy, their rights have
actually become more restricted by the current adjudication procedures.
The SBEC was created to "grant educators the authority to govern the
standards of their profession."2 This includes the regulation of all facets
of the standards of conduct, continuing education, and certification of
public school educators.2 3 The SBEC is comprised of fourteen mem-
15. See id. (stating the procedures of placing an investigative warning on a teacher's
certificate).
16. See id. (summarizing SBEC's flagging of virtual teaching certificates); see also
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.252 (Vernon 1996) (allocating jurisdiction to SOAH).
17. Julie Leahy, Tex. Classroom Teachers Ass'n, PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF A RULE,
(July 5, 2004) (unpublished petition, on file with author) (arguing that the current proce-
dures do not distinguish the different types of misconduct are not distinguished).
18. See State Board for Educator Certification, http://www.sbec.state.tx.us/SBEC
Online/investdisc/caseinvesthistoricalcoding.pdf (showing that, as of May 31, 2005, the per-
centage of cases for sexual misconduct and code of ethics violations had changed to 27%
and 14% respectively) (last visited Oct. 11, 2005).
19. Act of May 30, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 21, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2 (Vernon)
(codified as amended at TEX. EDUC. CODE § 21 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2004-2005)) (pro-
viding authority to SBEC for all disciplinary procedures).
20. Since this comment was written, TEA has again merged with SBEC, though
SBEC remains solely responsible for all matters involving certification, and disciplinary
procedures as they pertain to this comment were left unchanged. See Press Release, Texas
Education Agency, TEA to SBEC: Welcome Home! (Aug. 11, 2005), http://www.tea.state.
tx.us/press/sbecrelease.html.
21. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2004-2005) (requiring
the majority of board members be educators in some capacity, allowing educators to gov-
ern themselves).
22. Id.; see also 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 249.4(a) (2004) (specifying the duties of the
SBEC).
23. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.031(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005).
[Vol. 8:95
INNOCENT UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY?
bers.24 The composition of the voting board members is as follows: four
classroom teachers, two administrators, one counselor, and four members
of the general public.25
There are two primary explanations for SBEC's failure to adequately
empower teachers to govern themselves. The first is that, while the board
members are mostly educators in some capacity, they have been ap-
pointed by the Governor of Texas. 26 Therefore, rather than merely acting
in accordance with their personal convictions, the majority of these board
members have conflicting political agendas. The second reason is that the
Board is actually comprised of only a few classroom teachers.27 The ma-
jority of the Board is comprised of administrators or other non-educators
who cannot adequately relate to the demands and life of a classroom
teacher. 28 Since few on the Board know and can fully appreciate the job
of a teacher, few educators perceive themselves to be self-governed.
2. Disciplinary Procedures
The SBEC "flags" a teacher's virtual certificate upon receipt of any
complaint, without regard to the legitimacy of the complaint.29 Thus, it is
possible for any future employer, namely a school district, to search
SBEC's website to uncover any restrictions that have been placed on a
teacher's certificate. 30 These "flags" have an effect similar to a prior con-
viction or significant warning of a teacher's fitness to teach. This warning
severely impairs the teacher's ability to find a job in another school dis-
trict. Hence, the teacher is put in a legal purgatory until SBEC initiates a
formal complaint with SOAH.3'
24. See § 21.033.
25. See § 21.033 (providing three appointed non-voting members as representatives of
the commissioner of education, commissioner of higher education, and the governor).
26. See § 21.033.
27. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.033(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005) (stating that
only four of the eleven voting members are actually teachers).
28. See § 21.033 (allocating two board members for administrators, and one for a
counselor. The other four positions are reserved for those that have not been employed in
the immediate past five years, and are currently not employed in education).
29. See Memorandum, supra note 14 (articulating that an investigatory warning is
placed on the virtual certificate prior to any investigation).
30. See State Board for Educator Certification, Official Record of Educator Certifi-
cates, http://www.sbec.state.tx.us/SBECOnline/virtcert.asp (providing a database for all vir-
tual certificates in the state of Texas) (last visited Oct. 11, 2005).
31. See State Board for Educator Certification, http://www.sbec.state.tx.us/SBEC
Online/about/agencywork.asp (last visited Oct. 11, 2005); see also TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 21.252 (Vernon 1996) (allocating jurisdiction to SOAH).
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3. Rationale for Due Process Violation
When analyzing the current issue in the abstract, it seems intuitive that
teachers are entitled to due process.32 However, on a policy level, it is
clear that current procedures represent the state's fear of liability for em-
ploying a teacher who is under investigation for misconduct. This reason-
ing goes against constitutional ideals by not affording teachers the right to
confront their accusers until after they have suffered irreparable conse-
quences because of the mere accusation.33 The United States criminal
justice system was founded upon the legal principle that an accused per-
son is innocent until proven guilty.34 There must be a way to balance the
desire to protect the general public, while preserving the rights guaran-
teed by the Constitution.35
Additionally, SBEC uses a statutory argument to justify the current
procedure. For example, the Texas Administrative Code ("TAC") pro-
vides that SBEC "may impose any additional conditions or restrictions
upon a certificate that the board deems necessary to facilitate the rehabil-
itation and professional development of the educator or to protect stu-
dents, parents of students, school personnel or officials."3 6 This language
can be interpreted to bestow upon SBEC the authority to place an inves-
tigative warning or restriction on a teacher's certificate, even before the
commencement of an investigation.37
The SBEC argues that the authority to flag certificates is derived from
other legislation as well.38 For example, section 552.001 of the Texas
Government Code provides that "it is the policy of this state that each
32. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971) ("At its core, the right to due
process reflects a fundamental value in our American constitutional system.").
33. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-82 (1972) ("For more than a century the
central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: 'Parties whose rights are to be
affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first
be notified.'") (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223, 233 (1864)).
34. See Joseph C. Cascarelli, Presumption of Innocence and Natural Law: Machiavelli
and Aquinas, 41 AM. J. JURIs. 229, 233 (1996) ("The concept-that a man or woman
charged with a crime should be presumed innocent and should remain innocent until
proven guilty-is two thousand years old, if not older.").
35. See Thomas E. Baker, Constitutional Theory in a Nutshell, 13 WM. & MARY BILL
RTs. J. 57, 101 (2004) (expressing the need to balance an individual's, liberty and the re-
strictive power of the government); see also id. at 102 (advocating that fundamental fair-
ness requires adequate notice, as well as an opportunity to be heard).
36. 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 249.15(b) (2004).
37. See § 249.15(b).
38. Memorandum, supra note 14 (citing TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.041 (Vernon
1996 & Supp. 2004-2005)) (authorizing SBEC to regulate in a manner that it sees fit); see
also TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.001 (Vernon 2004); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.007
(Vernon 2004) (compelling a government agency to release public information and author-
izing that agency to voluntarily release other pertinent information of its own accord).
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person is entitled, unless otherwise expressly provided by law... to com-
plete information about the affairs of government."39 Moreover, section
552.007(a) authorizes a state agency to voluntarily release any informa-
tion to the public that is not expressly prohibited by law.n° The above
statutes are used to rationalize the disclosure of damaging, and quite pos-
sibly inaccurate, information.
Even those who are inclined to be apathetic to a procedural due pro-
cess issue are bothered by the possibility of repeated misconduct without
swift justice.
4. Teacher Concern
While a district is theoretically permitted to hire a teacher with an in-
vestigatory warning "flag" on their virtual certificate, it is unlikely that a
district would actually do so.4' As elected officials, and given that a
teacher's virtual certificate is available to the public, school board mem-
bers would be unlikely to give their approval, even if they believed the
teacher was wrongly accused, for fear of political backlash. For this rea-
son, there has been substantial concern from teachers and teachers' as-
sociations regarding SBEC's policies and practices in dealing with
teacher's certificates.
The Texas Classroom Teachers Association ("TCTA") recently filed a
petition with SBEC requesting better regulation of its flagging policies.42
In its petition, TCTA requested two significant alterations to the current
procedure.43 In its first request, the TCTA sought articulation of exactly
what type of misconduct allegation warrants a flagging. 4 Currently, all
complaints- serious, minor, or clearly fraudulent- are flagged without
distinction. 5 The petition further argues that misconduct of a de minimis
nature should not be flagged.46 De minimis offenses consist of: aban-
doning a contract; any misdemeanor that does not involve moral turpi-
39. § 552.001.
40. § 552.007. Though there is no statute that expressly forbids the disclosure of these
warnings to the public, statutes do exist restricting the disclosure of comparable informa-
tion in similar circumstances. See TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 143.089 (Vernon 1996 &
Supp. 2004-2005); TEx. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 143.1214 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005) (re-
stricting the ability of the government to disclose information regarding alleged miscon-
duct of firefighters and police officers); see also TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.355 (Vernon
1996 & Supp. 2004-2005) (providing that teachers' appraisals are confidential).
41. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.163 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2004-2005) (requiring
either school board or superintendent approval as an integral part of the procedure for
hiring teachers).
42. See Leahy, supra note 17.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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tude; or any other conduct not affecting the teacher's ability to safely
supervise students.47
TCTA's petition next advocated that the teacher should be able to peti-
tion the Executive Director of SBEC directly to seek the removal of such
an investigative warning.48 Currently, teachers are not afforded this op-
tion; they are forced to wait until a formal complaint has been filed.
TCTA goes on to suggest that the petition should be granted unless good
cause is shown to maintain the restriction.49
TCTA's proposed plan is far more narrowly-tailored than the current
plan. The proposed rule simultaneously balances the interests of the pub-
lic in keeping teachers that are accused of serious misconduct from teach-
ing until an investigation and a formal complaint are fully adjudicated,
while still allowing teachers accused of de minimus offenses to continue
serving as educators in Texas.5" Moreover, it provides for an affirmative
act on the part of the teacher to challenge the placement of an investiga-
tory warning.5' The teacher is allowed to petition the Executive Director
of SBEC to show good cause for the flagging,52 though the legal term
"good cause" is somewhat ambiguous.53
III. A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
A. Overview
The Fifth Amendment ensures that "[n]o person shall be... deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."54 The Four-
teenth Amendment reiterates such language as it pertains to a state's
ability to operate. 5 Procedural due process challenges can be narrowed
into three basic criterion: 1) there must be a deprivation; 2) of property,
47. Leahy, supra note 17.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. (acknowledging the need to disclose investigative warnings for those accused
of serious violations, yet maintaining that those accused of de minimis violations are arbi-
trarily deprived of a liberty interest without due process).
51. See Julie Leahy, Texas Classroom Teachers Association, PETITION FOR ADOPTION
OF A RULE, (July 5, 2004) (unpublished petition, on file with author) (requiring the teacher
to petition to the Executive Director of SBEC in the event he wants to challenge the dis-
closure of the warning).
52. Id.
53. See generally Naomi McCuistion, Comment, Good Cause in the Texas Rules of
Civil Procedure, 36 ST. MARY'S L. J. 445 (2005) (showing an in-depth analysis of the many
meanings of the phrase "good cause").
54. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
55. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV; see also Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S.
106, 111-12 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (tying the Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution with Due Process).
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liberty or life; 3) without due process afforded by law.5 6 The state's dep-
rivation of a teacher's unencumbered teaching certificate clearly satisfies
the first requirement. The next two elements require a more comprehen-
sive analysis. The following sections will examine the teacher's employ-
ment reputation as a property interest and as a liberty interest, each
warranting varying degrees of due process.
B. Deprivation of life, liberty or property?
1. Property interest
Once a deprivation has been established, the deprivation must be
shown to affect a recognized liberty or property interest.5 7 The Supreme
Court has held that a public employee who has a reasonable expectation
of continued employment holds a property interest in that employment.58
In the Board of Regents v. Roth,59 the Court elaborates:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have
more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must, instead, have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it. It is a purpose of the ancient
institution of property to protect those claims upon which people
rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily under-
mined. It is a purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to pro-
vide an opportunity for a person to vindicate those claims.6"
Similarly, "Texas courts have held that once the right or privilege to
engage in a lawful profession or occupation is acquired, it is a right or
privilege protected by the due process clauses of state and federal
constitutions. ,61
A persuasive argument can be made that a teaching certificate, as a
prerequisite to employment, also qualifies as a property interest. In addi-
tion to being essential for employment as an educator, there is reliance
56. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 526 (2d ed. 2002).
57. Erwin Chemerinsky, Procedural Due Process Claims, 16 ToURo L. REV. 871, 871
(2000).
58. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972) ("[Iln the area of public employ-
ment ... public college professor[s] ... have interests in continued employment that are
safeguarded by due process." The Court further recalls the recent extension of this reason-
ing to a teacher who was hired under an implied promise for continuous employment
rather than under a contract or tenure) (citing Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 208
(1971); Slochower v. Bd. of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); and Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183 (1952)).
59. Roth, 408 U.S. 564.
60. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; see also Upshaw v. Alvin Indep. Sch. Dist., 31 F. Supp.
2d 553 (1999) (clarifying that once an individual has a property right in their employment,
there must be an opportunity to be heard).
61. See Leahy, supra note 51 (citing Francisco v. Bd. of Dental Exam'r, 149 S.W.2d
619, 622 (Tex. Civ. App. - Austin, 1941, writ, ref'd) (citing TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19)).
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upon its continued use. While flagging a teacher's certification does not
immediately terminate employment, the practical effect on a teacher's
ability to secure employment elsewhere is the same.
On the other hand, the Texas Supreme Court has suggested that a
teaching certificate does not carry with it a property interest.62 In State of
Texas et al v. Project Principle, a teachers' member group fought the ret-
roactive application of the "Texas Examination for Current Administra-
tors and Teachers" ("TECAT"). 63 The TECAT was a state-administered
exam, and the renewal of an educator's teaching certificate was contin-
gent upon a passing score.64 Until this time, teachers were under the im-
pression that a teaching certificate was an irrevocable contract that, once
issued, could not be modified by the state.65 However, in Project Princi-
ple, the court held that a teaching certificate is a license and therefore
revocable by the state.66 "The [district] court also stated that because the
certificate was a mere license, no due process guarantees were
applicable." 67
However, the nature of the alleged due process violation in the TE-
CAT cases makes them unlike the violation that occurs in "flagging" an
accused teacher's virtual certificate. In the TECAT cases, teachers forfeit
their certification if they fail to achieve a satisfactory score on the stan-
dardized test.68 This is an objective measure of a teacher's actual qualifi-
cation. On the other hand, SBEC regulations are far more subjective, if
not speculative. In restricting the certificates of teachers who have not
yet been found guilty of any wrongdoing, a teacher's certificate and repu-
tation is imposed upon even if the claim is never substantiated.
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Texas rationalizes their decision
with an emphasis on substantive due process rather than procedural due
process.7" This is an important distinction, as it is possible that the court
62. See State v. Project Principle, 724 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. 1987); see also Texas State
Teachers Ass'n v. Texas, 711 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. App. - Austin 1986, no writ) (agreeing with
the holding in the Project Principle case concerning property interest in teaching
certificates).
63. See Project Principle, 724 S.W.2d 389.
64. Id. at 389.
65. See id. at 390 (overruling petitioner's argument that a teaching certificate was a
contract that could not be changed after execution).
66. See id. (citing Marrs v. Mathews, 270 S.W. 586, 589 (Tex. Civ. App. - Texarkana
1925, writ ref'd)).
67. Id. at 390 n.1.
68. Project Principle, 724 S.W.2d at 390.
69. See id. at 391 ("Likewise, teacher testing is a rational means of achieving the legiti-
mate state objective of ensuring that public school educators meet a specified standards of
competency.").
70. See id. (articulating certain appellate reviews that suffice the procedural due pro-
cess issue).
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would have come to a different conclusion if no procedural due process
had been afforded to the teachers.
These distinctions make the reasoning in the TECAT cases inapplica-
ble to the due process violation that occurs when teaching certificates are
"flagged." A teacher can ensure compliance with the objective require-
ment of standardized testing.71 Conversely, a teacher cannot prevent the
filing of a complaint without merit, and possibly, with malice.
Moreover, the TECAT cases are in direct conflict with the prior United
States Supreme Court holding in Bell v. Burson.2
Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case, their continued pos-
session may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspen-
sion of issued licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates
important interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are
not to be taken away without that procedural due process required
by the Fourteenth Amendment.73
The Texas Supreme Court considers a teaching certificate to be a li-
cense. 74 Therefore, according to Bell, the teaching certificate, as a mere
license, carries with it a certain amount of procedural due process. 75
In the Bell case, the Court could have reached a different conclusion if
the state was requiring individuals to continue taking driving tests in or-
der to maintain eligibility for their license.76
It is important to note that in Bell, the court differentiates the amount
of due process required for different types of interests.77 For instance,
"procedures adequate to determine a welfare claim may not suffice to try
a felony charge." 78 Nonetheless, even if one was to assume that only a
slight property interest is affected by "flagging" a teacher's virtual certifi-
71. See id. (providing a teacher with the opportunity to take the exam more than
once).
72. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
73. See id. at 539 (citing Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)).
74. Project Principle, 724 S.W.2d at 390.
75. See Burson, 402 U.S. at 539 (stating that procedural due process is required before
revoking or suspending a driver's license); see also Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 66 (1979)
(holding that failure to hold a prompt hearing after suspending a horse training license is
unconstitutional); see also Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 367 U.S. 442, 452 (1954) (holding that
suspension of a medical license requires due process consideration).
76. Compare Burson, 402 U.S. at 540 (hinting at a different conclusion if periodic
driving tests were required to remain licensed) with Project Principle, 724 S.W.2d at 391
(noting that educators are allowed to retake the exam if they fail).
77. See Burson, 402 U.S. at 540 (holding that the amount of due process required may
differ proportionally to the amount of deprivation).
78. Id.
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cate, that interest still deserves due process. In Goss v. Lopez,79 the
United States Supreme Court held that its "view has been that as long as
a property deprivation is not de minimis, its gravity is irrelevant to the
question whether account must be taken of the Due Process Clause." 80
2. Liberty Interest
Assuming, arguendo, that no property interest has been implicated, an-
other strong argument exists in favor of a teacher's liberty interest in the
ability to gain employment. The Supreme Court has defined both prop-
erty interests and liberty interests, yet there are circumstances, like the
situation at hand, which can obscure any distinction. As applied to the
current case, a property interest can be implicated by the deprivation of a
license,81 yet the deprivation also amounts to a liberty interest since it
renders educators unable to gain future employment in their chosen pro-
fession.82 In the Supreme Court case Board of Regents v. Roth,83 the
Court defined a liberty interest as the right "to engage in any of the com-
mon occupations of life. . . and generally to enjoy those privileges long
recognized.... In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt
that the meaning of 'liberty' must be broad indeed., 84 There are many
other cases which also suggest that a liberty interest is implicated when-
ever the state prevents someone from the opportunity of being em-
ployed.85 The bottom line is that teachers are not free to seek other
employment within their chosen profession because of a stigmatizing
publication by SBEC that does not even attempt to suggest its validity.
"The Supreme Court, in a procedural due process case, has defined the
term 'occupational liberty' as the 'freedom to take advantage of other
employment opportunities."' 86 If SBEC is not trying to restrict a
teacher's future employment by placing an investigatory warning on a
79. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
80. Id. at 576.
81. See Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (holding that procedural due process is required before
revoking or suspending a driver's license); see also Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979)
(recognizing that a property interest is present in a horse training license).
82. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972) (citing Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895-96 (1961) (holding that a liberty interest is
stretched too far to apply a liberty interest in situations where the individual is free to seek
other employment)).
83. Roth, 408 U.S. 564.
84. Id. at 572.
85. See Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442 (1954); Singleton v. Cecil, 176 F.3d
419 (8th Cir. 1999); Lee v. Dowling, 664 N.E.2d 1243 (N.Y. 1996); Richardson v.
Chevrefils, 552 A.2d 89 (N.H. 1988); Singleton v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd., 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8484 (N.Y. Dist. 2000).
86. See Cecil, 176 F.3d at 429 (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573
(1972)).
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teacher's certificate, then what is the purpose of such a stigmatizing red
flag? There is no other purpose on its face or otherwise. The only pur-
pose is for SBEC to put school districts on notice that the teacher is being
investigated for potential wrongdoing in order to minimize future liability
of the state. Other courts have held that a balance must be struck be-
tween the state's interest and the significant risk of erroneous depriva-
tions.8 7 It is obtuse to think that such an investigatory warning does not
dramatically minimize teachers' rights to seek employment in their cho-
sen profession. Whether the investigation ultimately exonerates the
teacher is irrelevant since no district will take a chance on that individual
until the warning has been removed.
3. Liberty Interest of Reputation
Finally, an argument can be asserted that a liberty interest has been
implicated as it pertains to a deprivation of reputation. There is no ques-
tion that the restriction of one's certificate for alleged misconduct ad-
versely affects one's reputation. Goss v. Lopez was a Supreme Court
case concerning the loss of reputation.88 In Goss, students were sus-
pended for a period of less than ten days without due process of the
law.89 The Court held:
Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at
stake because of what the government is doing to him," the minimal
requirements of the Clause must be satisfied .... It is apparent that
the claimed right of the State to determine unilaterally and without
process whether that misconduct has occurred immediately collides
with the requirements of the Constitution.90
This language is directly on point with the loss of reputation a teacher
suffers when a restriction is attached to a certificate. The only difference
is that a teacher will suffer more significant consequences, since a teacher
is restricted in the ability to secure a job.
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court diluted its holding in Goss in the
following cases, Paul v. Davis9' and Siegert v. Gilley.92 In the Davis case,
the Court held that a loss of reputation was not a deprivation of liberty
87. See Dowling, 664 N.E.2d at 1250; see also Chevrefils, 552 A.2d at 95 (quoting Wis-
consin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)).
88. See generally Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (discussing the issue of a loss of
reputation as a liberty interest for procedural due process purposes).
89. Id. at 568.
90. Id. at 574 (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)) (empha-
sis added).
91. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
92. See generally Davis, 424 U.S. 693; see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991)
(holding that harm to reputation alone does not implicate a liberty interest).
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per se.93 However, the Court did recognize in Siegert that due process is
required where the loss of reputation arises out of another tangible detri-
ment, like termination of employment.9 4 The current situation is a text-
book example of such a claim. This leaves us with the question of how to
balance due process interests. Is there another tangible detriment consti-
tuting a property interest or liberty interest?
Other courts have asked the same question in cases that address the
situations of those in a position similar to Texas teachers.95 For example,
the New Hampshire Supreme Court took the above language a step fur-
ther in Richardson v. Chevrefils,9 6 stating: "[w]here a person's good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the gov-
ernment is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essen-
tial."97 The Richardson case involves a state welfare employee who was
put on a registry comprised of child abusers after the welfare director
learned that the plaintiff was involved in a child abuse incident.98 The
court held that the defendants erred in failing to provide notice and a
hearing before placing him on the state registry.99 While this court
dances around the issue of reputation as a liberty interest, it found that
both a liberty and property interest were implicated, and tied them inti-
mately with the loss of reputation."° This case is nearly identical to the
situation Texas teachers are currently facing. By issuing unsubstantiated
warnings, the state is damaging the reputation of teachers, thereby
preventing employment in their chosen profession.
The Court of Appeals of New York came to a similar conclusion in Lee
v. Dowling.1° 1 This case also involved a social worker, challenging the
constitutionality of being placed on a registry of child abusers."' 2 Again,
the court concluded that the stigma of a defamatory statement is not, in
itself, sufficient to trigger due process. 103 The court used the "stigma
plus" reasoning, which requires more than mere damage to reputation to
warrant due process, but can be triggered when, for example, there is a
93. Davis, 424 U.S. at 712.
94. See Siegert 500 U.S. at 234; see also Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622,
657 (1980).
95. See Richardson v. Chevrefils, 552 A.2d 89, 95 (N.H. 1988) (citing Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971)); see also Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191
(1952).
96. Chevrefils, 552 A.2d 89.
97. Id. at 95 (quoting Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 437) (emphasis added).
98. Chevrefils, 552 A.2d at 90-92.
99. Id. at 96.
100. See id. at 93-95.
101. See Lee v. Dowling, 664 N.E.2d 1243.
102. Id. at 1246.
103. See id. at 1249.
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loss of opportunity of future employment."° The preceding reasoning is
a prime example of what Texas public school teachers are currently
experiencing.
The court considered three factors in determining whether procedures
mandated by statute protect one's procedural due process.1 °5 Those fac-
tors are: "(1) The private interest affected by the state action, (2) the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used
and the probable value, if any, of additional safeguards and (3) a consid-
eration of the government's interest."'" The court held that even though
the government has an important interest in preventing child abusers
from working for the state and also in keeping expenses down, there must
be a balance of interests when taking into account the real possibility of
erroneous listings of innocent individuals. °7
Finally, the court used a much-needed common sense approach stating,
"it makes obvious sense in most cases 'to minimize substantially unfair or
mistaken deprivations' by insisting that the hearing be granted at a time
when the deprivation can still be prevented. That is particularly so in cases
involving reputational [sic] injuries."' 8 This language is clearly applica-
ble for educators since one cannot reasonably be expected to refute alle-
gations before their reputation is damaged.
C. Was It a Deprivation Without Due Process of the Law?
In this setting, it is clear that such a deprivation has occurred without
due process of the law. This is not a case where one is challenging the
sufficiency of due process afforded; the state affords no procedural due
process. Unlike the functional, yet wholly-biased, school board hearings
for termination of employees by the districts, this disclosure cannot be
appealed.'0 9 To provide adequate procedural due process, both "notice
and an opportunity to be heard" must be provided." 0 Moreover, the Su-
preme Court case Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., articu-
lates these requirements in the following quote:
104. See id. (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
105. Id. at 1250.
106. Dowling, 664 N.E.2d at 1250-51 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976)).
107. Id. at 1251.
108. Id. at 1252 (emphasis added) (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 79-82
(1972)).
109. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 21.301-07 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2004-2005).
110. Linda S. Mullenix, Taking Adequacy Seriously: The Inadequate Assessment of
Adequacy in Litigation and Settlement Classes, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1687, 1722 (2004) (citing
Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 260-61 (2d Cir. 2001)).
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Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words
of the Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a mini-
mum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by ad-
judication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case.11'
In the current situation, SBEC provides neither adequately.
The Texas Administrative Code sets forth the notice requirement in
disciplinary proceedings attempting to suspend or otherwise sanction a
teaching certificate; yet, the definition of compliance is remarkably un-
clear.1 2 Section 249.14(h) states in pertinent part: "Prior to the agency's
filing a petition, the agency shall mail.., notice of the facts... to warrant
the intended action and shall provide the person an opportunity to show
compliance with all requirements of law for the retention of the certifi-
cate or other enjoyment.""' 3 The rule itself is vague in view of the fact
that it does not provide any timeline for such notice. 114 Notice may be
sent more than a year from the time that SBEC first receives an allega-
tion. Assuming that this section could pass judicial scrutiny, there are
serious doubts as to whether SBEC even complies with such a liberal
regulation. The language "intended action" contained in §249.14(h)," 5
has, evidently, been improperly interpreted by SBEC as applicable only
to the formal complaint brought to SOAH. This is due in large part to
the vague nature of the definition." 6 The SBEC is quick to forget that
there are two "intended action[s]" that occur:1 1 7 the first is putting an
investigatory warning on a teaching certificate, eliminating a teacher's
ability to get a job;" 8 the second is the filing of the formal petition."19
The SBEC currently sends written notice at their leisure, specifying that
the agency is currently seeking administrative action against the
teacher.120 This notice in no way warns the teacher that certification has
already been flagged. In fact, teachers are usually unaware that their cer-
111. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
112. 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 249.14(h) (2004).
113. § 249.14(h) (emphasis added); see also 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 249.3(4) (2004)
("Agency - the board acting through its executive director, staff, or agents, as distinguished
from the board acting through its voting members in a decision making capacity.").
114. § 249.14(h) (providing no timeframe for the written notice).
115. § 249.14(h).
116. See generally 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 249.3 (2004) (omitting a formal definition
of the phrase "intended action").
117. See § 249.14(h).
118. See Memorandum, supra note 14 (describing the placing of an investigatory
warning on a teaching certificate).
119. See 19 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 249.14(d) (2004) (discussing procedures and author-
ity for a formal complaint to be filed).
120. See § 249.14(h) (showing that notice only must be given at the point that the
board files a formal petition).
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tificates contain a warning label until teachers unsuccessfully apply for a
subsequent job. This is constitutionally impermissible since teachers
never knew that their certificate was flagged, and never had the opportu-
nity to answer to any allegations before being tainted by them.
Additionally, the restriction cannot be appealed because no formal
complaint was ever filed. Therefore, a teacher has no choice but to find
other means of income to pay their bills and future attorney's fees, until
SBEC actually files a formal complaint. It is impossible to consider this
situation adequate in terms of due process.
In fairness, SBEC does provide procedural due process once it files a
formal complaint to SOAH. 12 1 A teacher is afforded a hearing with an
independent hearing examiner from SOAH. 122 However, this does not
mitigate the harm caused by the lack of procedural due process through
the publication of the initial investigatory warning. The problem is that
once SBEC files a formal complaint with SOAH, the damage has already
occurred. By the time the hearing has been afforded, the educator has
become both exhausted and disenfranchised with the lack of justice, and
often pursues alternate forms of employment. For this deprivation with-
out due process, SBEC must be held accountable.
IV. SOLUTION
Is there a solution to this constitutional quagmire? A solution does
exist that will more narrowly-tailor the state's interest while also passing
constitutional scrutiny.
The state has an important government interest in keeping those ac-
cused of sexual misconduct, or any other crime constituting moral turpi-
tude that, if proven, would render an individual unfit to supervise from
teaching while SBEC has an opportunity to investigate the claim.' 23
However, teachers have a constitutionally-protected right to due process
before being deprived of the ability to get a job in their chosen profes-
sion.124 It is the proverbial question: when do my rights infringe upon
121. See § 249.14(h) (stating that written notice shall be sent prior to taking adminis-
trative action).
122. See TEx. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.252 (Vernon 1996) (allocating jurisdiction to
SOAH).
123. See Eric J. Kuperman, Note, The Mark of Cain: No Second Chance for Teachers
Convicted of Sex Offenses Against Students, 3 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 491, 511 (1996)
("The registration statute in question had a rational basis, namely the state's legitimate
interest in controlling crime and preventing sex offenses." (citing People v. Mills, 81 Cal.
App 3d. 171, 181 (1978)).
124. See Theresa Keeley, Comment, Good Moral Character: Already an Unconstitu-
tionally Vague Concept and Now Putting Bar Applicants in a Post-911 World on an Elevated
Threat Level, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 844, 871 n.177 (2003-2004) ("'Freedom to practice [a]
chosen profession' and 'the right to... follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable
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your rights; and when they do, whose rights prevail? Above, the Bell case
discussed how the Court differentiated the amount of due process re-
quired by the amount of deprivation.' 25 This is key in deciding what the
court should interpret as sufficient due process in the case at bar.126 A
nominal set of procedures could very well be sufficient in the current set
of circumstances.
127
The only two changes required to withstand constitutional scrutiny are
notice that an investigatory warning has been posted, and a preliminary
hearing or screening. The notice will: help to keep SBEC from errone-
ously flagging a certificate; inform the teacher about the investigatory
warning; and provide the teacher with any available procedures to chal-
lenge this warning. The teacher should be able to request a preliminary
hearing to decide whether SBEC believes that the charge is serious
enough to warrant a full investigation, and likewise be able to request a
timeline for filing a formal complaint. The hearing should take place
within a reasonable time after the request. This hearing can be as infor-
mal as a phone conference with the parties' attorneys and an Administra-
tive Law Judge, or even the Executive Director of SBEC. In fact, these
proceedings could actually be adjudicated in preliminary pleadings, not
unlike a motion to dismiss. Either way, this accomplishes three vital
goals. First, it requires SBEC to open up their file in a timely manner and
decide if there is even enough evidence to file a formal complaint. This
alone serves to expedite the process since, as it stands now, it could be
months before SBEC even has a chance to look at the file. Second, a
teacher may fully admit to any misconduct and the parties can agree to a
just punishment much quicker than if the file is gathering dust for the past
few months. Finally, and of greatest significance to this comment, is that
at the very least, the ball would be rolling. Once this occurs, teachers can
take it upon themselves to advance the process.
Logistically and practically speaking, this process may become a rub-
ber-stamping expedition, and afterwards the red flag will still be placed
on the teaching certificate. For the purposes of this article, such measures
would at least afford notice to teachers and a preliminary opportunity to
be heard, and thereby withstanding constitutional muster. The reason
that this mere facade of a hearing would work is that it provides some
due process in allowing a teacher to subsequently appeal or otherwise
government interference comes within the 'liberty' and 'property' concepts of the Fifth
Amendment."' (quoting Greene V. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959)) (emphasis added)).
125. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971).
126. See Burson, 402 U.S. at 540 (explaining that different liberties require different
amounts of procedural due process).
127. A teacher is not being put on trial for their life, but their ability to secure future
employment. Therefore lesser procedures are appropriate. See Burson, 402 U.S. at 540.
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expedite the entire process once the initial hearing has taken place. Oth-
erwise, SBEC has no motivation to quickly adjudicate a teacher's case.
It is easy to understand and appreciate a state's interest in keeping
those accused of gross misconduct from teaching until the state has a
chance to adjudicate its case.' 2 8 In fact, few would be persuaded by an
argument advocating that accused sex offenders continue to teach.
129
Not unlike the chilling thought of a murderer not prosecuted, no one
wants to see an unfit teacher in a classroom. That does not mean, how-
ever, that the state can arbitrarily deprive this class of educators the due
process rights established in the Constitution. 130 Further analysis indi-
cates that the solution proposed herein strikes a balance between grant-
ing rights to teachers and protecting the state's children.
This preliminary adjudication would require the state, namely SBEC,
to offer evidence of the alleged misconduct before the hearing officer.
For purposes of this hearing only, any evidence presented by SBEC
would be presumed true. This is not unlike grand juries in the criminal
field where any evidence the state presents is taken as true, and other-
wise-inadmissible evidence is considered admissible for purposes of the
indictment. 3 ' Criminal jurisprudence allows this indictment procedure
due to the understanding that defendants will get their day in court. 132 A
preliminary proceeding will effectively separate the teachers accused of
sexual misconduct, crimes involving moral turpitude, or any other mis-
conduct that renders the teacher unfit to supervise the youth of the state,
from those teachers with investigatory warnings issued by mistake, or for
inconsequential reasons. The fact is that many of the "heinous crimes"
teachers are accused of are nothing more than a complaint filed by an
agitated parent or colleague that has nothing to do with an educator's
ability to teach in this state. In cases where the allegation, if true, would
seriously and adversely affect a teacher's ability to supervise the youth of
this state, SBEC should be able to flag the teacher's certificate until such
a time that the allegations may be sufficiently investigated.
Alternately, in the case where teacher A dislikes teacher B and files a
de minimis complaint to SBEC under the code of ethics, such complaint
128. See Kuperman, supra note 123, at 504 ("While it is important to carefully analyze
the advantages and disadvantages of such a system, and to examine the rights of offenders,
the interest in protecting children from imminent harm is paramount and should prevail.").
129. See id. at 495 (discussing policy goals of sex offender legislation).
130. See Richardson v. Chevrefils, 552 A.2d 89, 96 (N.H. 1988) (holding that although
the state has a legitimate interest in keeping child abusers off the streets, procedural due
process cannot be circumvented).
131. See Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Grand Jury Investigations, 51
S.C. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1999) (articulating that inadmissible evidence is still permissible for
purposes of the Grand Jury) (citing Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 361-63 (1956)).
132. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956).
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does not affect teacher A's ability to supervise children in the state, and
therefore, no investigatory warning should be applied. Again, this will
also allow the parties to enter into negotiations in a more expedited fash-
ion. Take, for instance, a teacher whose misconduct warrants a one-year
suspension of their certification. It would behoove the teacher to take
such a plea, since it would likely take more than a year before that
teacher is provided the opportunity to fully adjudicate the merits. Giving
both parties the opportunity to open the lines of communication earlier
will help to increase plea bargaining which currently keeps our criminal
system from getting so backed up. An increase in plea bargaining not
only saves the SBEC time, it also helps save tax dollars by reducing the
amount of the state's attorneys' fees.
This proposed solution not only provides for a constitutional means of
providing due process, it also affords a constitutional means of keeping
those accused of heinous crimes from teaching until such a time that guilt
or innocence can be decided. Because the deprivation would be more
narrowly-tailored to the goal of preventing criminals from teaching, the
investigatory warning could actually contain stronger language. This
would also help to close the loophole that currently allows those accused
of sexual misconduct to hypothetically work at another school before
charges have actually been brought.
One major concern would be the added expense of holding this prelim-
inary hearing. Providing hearings that currently have not been adjudi-
cated will increase the costs associated with the program, but there are
aspects that would help mitigate those costs. First, these hearings would
be very brief in time, lasting as few as fifteen minutes. This hearing only
requires that SBEC articulate the allegation, as well as provide reasons
why SBEC should be permitted to flag the teacher's certificate until such
a time that they may complete their investigation. There would also be a
few minutes allocated to teachers so they may argue why they should not
be flagged during the interim period. As stated earlier, ultimate costs are
likely to be minimized since this proposal encourages a teacher to accept
a shortened suspension of their certificate rather than wait around for the
case to be finally adjudicated.
V. CONCLUSION
Teachers, like all persons in the United States, are entitled to due pro-
cess.13 3 Sadly, a trend toward deprivation of a clean teaching certificate
has emerged, costing some teachers the ability to seek employment.
133. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374-75 (1971) ("At its core, the right to
due process reflects a fundamental value in our American constitutional system.").
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A solution has been proposed. It would not produce overwhelmingly
costly changes and could save money in some cases. Supreme Court Jus-
tice Jackson links the due process protection to the equal protection
clause in the following quote: 134
The framers of the Constitution knew... nothing opens the door to
arbitrary action so effectively as to allow. . . officials to pick and
choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to
escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if
larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no better measure to
assure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in
operation. 135
Teachers historically receive an unequal share of responsibility and
blame. Our society expects the impossible from them and punishes them
for not working miracles. Current procedures have caused educators to
become more guarded, both in and out of the classroom, adversely affect-
ing the relationship with their students. The good old days where a
teacher would give their students a ride home if their parents worked late
are gone. Not because the need is gone and not because our teachers are
unwilling, but because it is just too risky, and prudent teachers cannot
afford to risk their careers to help a child in need.
Teachers are among the lowest-paid professionals that have a degree
from four-year institutions. 136 Failing to provide due process creates an
added burden to the hardship teachers endure as professionals. We are
quick to forget that all successful people are products of one or more
great teachers in their life,'137 and the relationship between student and
teacher is of great importance. 138 As long as teachers are deprived of
their due process rights, this remains the land of the free, for everyone
except teachers.
134. See Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
135. Id. at 112-13.
136. Dave Winans, A Teacher's Worth, NEA TODAY, Oct. 2004, http://www.nea.org/
neatoday/0410/teachercomp.html.
137. Quotes for Teachers, http://www.rit.edu/-andpph/text-quotations.html ("Every
artist was at first an amateur." (quoting Ralph W. Emerson) (last visited Oct. 17, 2005)).
138. Quotes for Teachers, http://www.rit.edu/-andpph/text-quotations.html ("I put
the relation of a fine teacher to a student just below the relation of a mother to a son"
(quoting Thomas Wolfe) (last visited Oct. 17, 2005).
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